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Temporarily Out of Order: Temporal
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Children With Autism Spectrum
Disorder
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1 Center for Language and Cognition Groningen (CLCG), University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands, 2 Department
of Psychiatry, University Medical Center Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
Clinical reports suggest that children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) struggle with
time perception, but few studies have investigated this. This is the first study to examine
these children’s understanding of before and after. These temporal conjunctions have
been argued to require additional cognitive effort when conjoining two events in a clause
order that is incongruent with their order in time. Given the suggested time perception
impairment and well-established cognitive deficits of children with ASD, we expected
them to have difficulties interpreting temporal conjunctions, especially in an incongruent
order. To investigate this, the interpretation of before and after in congruent and
incongruent orders was examined in 48 children with ASD and 43 typically developing
(TD) children (age 6–12). Additional tasks were administered to measure Theory of Mind
(ToM), working memory (WM), cognitive inhibition, cognitive flexibility, IQ, and verbal
ability. We found that children with ASD were less accurate in their interpretation of
temporal conjunctions than their TD peers. Contrary to our expectations, they did not
have particular difficulties in an incongruent order. Furthermore, older children showed
better overall performance than younger children. The difference between children
with ASD and TD children was explained by WM, ToM, IQ, and verbal ability, but
not by cognitive inhibition and flexibility. These cognitive functions are more likely to
be impaired in children with ASD than in TD children, which could account for their
poorer performance. Thus, the cognitive factors found to affect the interpretation of
temporal language in children with ASD are likely to apply in typical development as
well. Sufficient WM capacity and verbal ability may help children to process complex
sentences conjoined by a temporal conjunction. Additionally, ToM understanding was
found to be related to children’s interpretation of temporal conjunctions in an incongruent
order, indicating that perspective taking is required when events are presented out
of order. We conclude from this that perspective-taking abilities are needed for the
interpretation of temporal conjunctions, either to shift one’s own perspective as a hearer
to another point in time, or to shift to the perspective of the speaker to consider the
speaker’s linguistic choices.
Keywords: autism spectrum disorder, executive functioning, perspective taking, temporal conjunctions, Theory
of Mind
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INTRODUCTION
Time is an important dimension by which we make sense of the
world (Navon, 1978). Time is also deeply rooted in the structural
organization of language (Klein, 1994). In language, time is
generally conceived as a sequential order of events, where one
event follows another from past to present to future. Speakers can
use temporal expressions, like before or after, to express the order
of events in time either in order of occurrence (i.e., temporally
congruent) or out of order (i.e., temporally incongruent). The
interpretation of the temporal conjunctions before and after
in an incongruent order is found to be difficult for typically
developing (TD) children (Clark, 1971; Pyykkönen and Järvikivi,
2012; Blything et al., 2015; de Ruiter et al., 2018). This may
hold even more for children with an autism spectrum disorder
(ASD). Clinical reports suggest that children with ASD encounter
difficulties in time perception (Wing, 1996). Additionally, some
studies have suggested that individuals with ASD have difficulty
interpreting before and after (Boucher, 2001; Perkins et al.,
2006). The present study investigates time perception in language
in children with ASD and their TD peers by examining their
interpretation of sentences containing temporal conjunctions.
Before and after are viewed as the prototypical linguistic
expressions indicating temporal order (Schilder and Tenbrink,
2001). Speakers can use these expressions in several ways to
express the order of events. For example, all four sentences below
indicate that someone first climbed a tree and next read a book:
(1) He climbed the tree before he read the book.
(2) Before he read the book, he climbed the tree.
(3) He read the book after he climbed the tree.
(4) After he climbed the tree, he read the book.
The speaker’s choice of before in a main-subordinate clause order
(1) and after in a reversed clause order (4) result in a congruent
presentation of the temporal order of events, whereas before in a
subordinate-main clause order (2) and after in a reversed clause
order (3) result in an incongruent presentation. Thus, it depends
on the speaker’s choice of type of conjunction and clause order
whether the hearer should interpret the event order as congruent
or incongruent.
Developmental studies in TD children report that congruency
has an effect on the correct interpretation of before and after
(Clark, 1971; Trosborg, 1982; McCormack and Hanley, 2011;
Pyykkönen and Järvikivi, 2012; Blything et al., 2015; de Ruiter
et al., 2018). Children under the age of 7 have more difficulties
interpreting conjunctions in a temporally incongruent order than
in a temporally congruent order, and mostly rely on the order
of presentation of the events. Pyykkönen and Järvikivi (2012)
showed that children between 8 and 12 years old still experience
difficulties interpreting temporal conjunctions in an incongruent
order, especially when the cue to event order occurs sentence-
medially, as in example sentence (3).
Children’s difficulties with interpreting temporal conjunctions
in an incongruent order have been explained in various ways.
For example, these difficulties have been argued to result from
a still fragile understanding of the meaning of the temporal
conjunctions before and after (Clark, 1971), from difficulty
shifting one’s perspective to a different point in time (McCormack
and Hoerl, 1999; McCormack and Hanley, 2011), from difficulty
processing subordinate-main clause orders (Diessel, 2008), and
from difficulty holding information active in working memory
(WM) during processing to create a chronological mental
representation of the events (Blything et al., 2015; Blything and
Cain, 2016). In adults, interpreting temporal conjunctions in an
incongruent rather than congruent order comes with processing
costs and has been shown to tax WM (Münte et al., 1998). So,
interpreting temporal conjunctions in an incongruent order may
require additional cognitive effort.
According to anecdotal evidence and clinical reports,
individuals with ASD encounter difficulties in time perception
(Wing, 1996). They often report a need to adhere to rituals and
routines and are commonly preoccupied with timetables, clocks,
and calendars, which may serve to compensate for their failure
to predict future events and their disorientation in time (Allman
and DeLeon, 2009). This led Boucher (2001) to suggest that
individuals with ASD have an impaired sense of time. So far,
few studies have been conducted on time perception in children
with ASD. Some studies report intact time perception (Wallace
and Happé, 2008; Gil et al., 2012), while other studies suggest
that children with ASD experience particular difficulties with
understanding temporal ordering and concepts such as duration,
succession, past, and future (Gillberg and Peeters, 1995; Boucher
et al., 2007; Maister and Plaisted-Grant, 2011). Also, some studies
report that children with ASD use fewer temporal expressions
in story-telling (Colle et al., 2008) and more often omit tense
marking than their TD peers (Roberts et al., 2004). These findings
regarding the production of temporal expressions suggest that
children with ASD may struggle with their interpretation of
temporal conjunctions as well, although a mismatch between
their production abilities and their comprehension abilities is also
conceivable (see Hendriks, 2014 for an overview and discussion
of attested production–comprehension asymmetries in child
language).
Executive functioning (EF) impairments, often present in
children with ASD (Hill, 2004), could make it especially difficult
to interpret temporal conjunctions in an incongruent order.
EF refers to cognitive processes such as WM (the capacity
system that allows the temporary storage and manipulation
of information necessary for complex tasks such as language
comprehension; Baddeley, 2000), inhibition (the mental ability
to suppress irrelevant information; Dagenbach and Carr, 1994),
and flexibility (the mental ability to shift between different
thoughts or actions; Scott, 1962), that allow for the flexible
alteration of thought and behavior in response to changing
contexts (Welsh and Pennington, 1988). Recent studies have
argued that TD children between 3 and 7 years old have
more difficulties interpreting temporal conjunctions in an
incongruent order than in a congruent order because more
information must be maintained in WM to revise the mental
representation of the events and create a chronological mental
representation (Blything et al., 2015; Blything and Cain, 2016).
The neuroimaging studies of Münte et al. (1998) and Ye et al.
(2012) suggest that, also for adults, WM is needed for the
temporal re-ordering of events. Furthermore, the ability to
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inhibit an initial interpretation and to flexibly revise a mental
representation of event order could be needed to interpret
conjunctions in an incongruent order (Pyykkönen and Järvikivi,
2012; Blything and Cain, 2016). Thus, in addition to WM, also
cognitive inhibition and cognitive flexibility may be involved.
In addition to impairments in these EF functions, also
impairments in Theory of Mind (ToM) understanding (Frith and
Frith, 2006) could make it difficult for children with ASD to
interpret temporal conjunctions in an incongruent order. ToM
is the ability to take the cognitive perspective of other people
to understand their beliefs, desires and intentions (Wimmer
and Perner, 1983) and is argued to be impaired in children
with ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). If the interpretation of
an incongruent temporal order involves ToM understanding,
an incongruent temporal order may be especially difficult
for children with ASD. Several studies have suggested that
the interpretation of temporal language not only requires a
consideration of the actual perspective in time but also a
consideration of alternative temporal perspectives (McGlone and
Harding, 1998; McCormack and Hoerl, 1999; Stocker, 2012).
According to McCormack and Hoerl (1999), hearers should not
only be able to shift from the actual perspective in time to
alternative temporal perspectives, but should also understand
the relation between these perspectives. Based on their account
of the development of temporal understanding, they posit
that “temporal perspective taking involves mentalizing abilities”
(McCormack and Hoerl, 1999; p. 174). Thus, mentalizing, or
ToM understanding, could be involved in the comprehension of
an incongruent order of events.
This is the first study to investigate how 6- to 12-year-
old children with ASD and their TD peers interpret temporal
conjunctions. We expect that all children find the interpretation
of before and after more difficult in the incongruent order than
in the congruent order, but that children with ASD find the
interpretation of these temporal conjunctions in an incongruent
order more difficult than their TD peers. As EF and ToM
have been reported to be possibly impaired in individuals
with ASD, this may explain the hypothesized difficulties with
the interpretation of temporal conjunctions in children with
ASD. Therefore, we further hypothesize that differences in
the interpretation of temporal conjunctions in an incongruent
order are associated with individual differences in EF and ToM
understanding. In addition to the specific cognitive factors EF
and ToM, we also examine the role of the more general cognitive
factors IQ and verbal ability. EF and ToM may not only provide
insight into the individual differences in ASD that play a role in
temporal language understanding, but may also provide insight
into what it is in the broad measures of IQ and verbal ability that
possibly explains temporal language understanding.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
In this study, 48 children with ASD and 43 TD children
participated. All children were monolingual native Dutch
children who did not have any reported language disorders.
The children in the ASD group were diagnosed with ASD by
clinicians on the basis of the DSM-IV-TR criteria (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000) and had an IQ of >75 based on a
clinically administered full IQ test. Additionally, in all children
(ASD as well as TD), certified professionals administered the
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al.,
1999), the Autism Diagnostic Interview Revised (ADI-R; Rutter
et al., 2003), two subtests (Vocabulary and Block Design) of the
WISC-III-NL to estimate IQ (Kort et al., 2002), and the Peabody
Picture Vocabulary Test to measure Verbal Ability (VA) (PPVT-
III-NL; Schlichting, 2005). Two children from the ASD group
were excluded because they neither met the ADOS criteria for
ASD nor the ADI-R criteria for ASD (cf. Risi et al.’s., 2006, ASD2
criteria). One child from the TD group met the ADOS criteria
for ASD and was therefore excluded as well, leaving 46 children
with ASD (mean age = 9;4, SD = 2;2) and 42 TD children (mean
age = 9;2, SD = 2;0) for further analysis. The group descriptives of
the ASD group and the TD group are provided in Table 1.
Children with ASD were recruited via outpatient clinics for
child and adolescent psychiatry in Groningen and a national
website for parents with children with ASD. TD children were
recruited via advertising in newsletters and flyers at schools in
the north of Netherlands. The children were tested individually
on a single day in a quiet room at the university with two
experimenters present. This study is part of a wider study
on language and perspective taking in children with ASD,
in which all children of the current study participated. The
medical ethical committee of the University Medical Hospital
Groningen evaluated this study as not falling under the Medical
Research Involving Human Subjects Act (WMO). Nevertheless,
we followed the required procedures and obtained written
informed consent from the parents of all participants for their
child’s participation in the research.
Language Comprehension Task
Comprehension of temporal conjunctions was tested using a
picture selection task. Per item, participants saw two pictures
side by side on a computer screen, each depicting an event (see
Figure 1).
Simultaneously, they heard a pre-recorded sentence
describing the temporal order of the two events. Participants
had to press one of two buttons on a button box to select
the picture that, according to the sentence, showed the event
that happened first. The sentences contained either voordat
(“before”) or nadat (“after”), which occurred either in sentence-
initial position (corresponding to subordinate-main clause
order) or in sentence-medial position (corresponding to
main-subordinate clause order). Examples of each of the
four conditions (conjunction × position) in the language
comprehension task are shown below in Dutch, followed by
word by word glosses and English translations:
(1) voordat (“before”) in sentence-initial position:
Voordat hij het boek las, klom hij in de boom.
before he the book read, climbed he in the tree
“Before he read the book, he climbed the tree.”
(2) voordat (“before”) in sentence-medial position:
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TABLE 1 | Description of the participants with autism spectrum disorder (ASD)
and the typically developing (TD) participants in this study.
Background
variables




Gender (boys:girls) 39:7 34:8 n.s.
Chronological age
(year; month)






Autistic disorder 4 0 –
Asperger’s disorder 2 0 –





ADOS and ADI 33 0 –
ADOS only 10 1 (excluded)e –
ADI only 3 0 –
Neither ADOS nor
ADI
2 (excluded)e 42 –
Estimated IQ
(WISC)c




Mean (SD) 104.48 (13.9) 113.62 (11.53) TD > ASD∗∗
Range 77–139 87–138
aPDD-NOS: pervasive developmental disorder-not otherwise specified; bThe ASD2
criteria of Risi et al. (2006) are: “a child meets criteria on Social and Communication
domains or meets criteria on Social and within two points of Communication criteria
or meets criteria on Communication and within two points of Social criteria or within
one point on both Social and Communication domains” (Risi et al., 2006; p. 1100);
cEstimated IQ of two subtests of the Dutch version of the Wechsler Intelligence
Scale for Children (WISC-III-NL; Kort et al., 2002); dNormed verbal ability score from
the Dutch version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT-III-NL; eExcluded
from the group descriptives in this table as well as from the analyses; Schlichting,
2005); ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Hij klom in de boom voordat hij het boek las.
he climbed in the tree before he the book read
“He climbed the tree before he read the book.”
(3) nadat (“after”) in sentence-initial position:
Nadat hij in de boom klom, las hij het boek.
after he in the tree climbed, read he the book
“After he climbed the tree, he read the book.”
(4) nadat (“after”) in sentence-medial position:
Hij las het boek nadat hij in de boom klom.
he read the book after he in the tree climbed
“He read the book after he climbed the tree.”
The events in sentences (2) and (3) are mentioned in a congruent
order, whereas the events in (1) and (4) are mentioned in
an incongruent order. All events were unrelated to avoid a
preference for one of the two event orders based on event
typicality.
Stimuli were presented and responses were recorded using
the computer software E-Prime 2.0 (Schneider et al., 2002).
First, children completed three practice items to practice that
the left and right button corresponded to the left and right
picture, respectively. This was followed by an introduction of
the boy in the pictures and three practice items containing other
temporal expressions (e.g., “today” and “yesterday”) to determine
whether the participant understood the principle of temporal
ordering in the task. Next, the participants received 32 test
items, with a short break in the middle. The test items were
distributed across 4 lists. Each list contained 16 congruent test
items and 16 incongruent test items in a randomized order. We
counterbalanced the position of the pictures on the screen. The
experiment took approximately 15 min.
Cognitive Tasks
Working Memory
To test WM, the N-Back task (Owen et al., 2005) was used.
In this task, participants had to watch and remember pictures
presented one by one on a computer screen and indicate whether
the picture on the screen was a particular object or not (0-back
or baseline condition), whether it matched the picture one trial
before (one-back condition), and whether it matched the picture
two trials before (two-back condition). Participants received a
practice session of 15 trials per condition and a test session
consisting of 60 trials per condition. The mean accuracy (ACC)
on the two-back condition was calculated as a measure of WM.
Cognitive Inhibition
To test cognitive inhibition, the Flanker task [Amsterdam
Neuropsychological Test battery (ANT) version 2.1; De
Sonneville, 1999] was administered. In this task, participants had
to identify the color of a target stimulus surrounded by eight
distractors (flankers). The target color was red or green and was
associated with the left or right button, respectively. The flankers
were either in the same color as the target (compatible trials)
or in the color that was associated with the opposite response
(incompatible trials). For this task, participants received 12
practice items, 40 compatible test items, and 40 incompatible test
items. The mean ACC and mean reaction time (RT) of cognitive
inhibition was measured by subtracting the mean ACC or RT
on compatible trials from the mean ACC or RT, respectively,
on incompatible trials (resulting in the congruency effect; see
Mullane et al., 2009).
Cognitive Flexibility
To test cognitive flexibility, we adapted the gender emotion
switch task of De Vries and Geurts (2012) to make it more similar
to a classical switch task (e.g., Rogers and Monsell, 1995). In our
shape–color switch task, participants saw pictures of round or
square figures in black or white on the computer screen and had
to press the left or right button to report the shape (round or
square) or the color (black or white) of the figure. The cue at the
top of the screen indicated whether the shape or the color had to
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1663
fpsyg-09-01663 September 4, 2018 Time: 11:45 # 5
Overweg et al. Temporal Perspective Taking in Autism
FIGURE 1 | An example of the two pictures of an item in the language comprehension task. Written informed consent was obtained from the parents for publication
of their child’s images.
be reported. Participants received 16 items to practice with shape,
16 items to practice with color, and 40 items to practice with
switching between shape and color. The test consisted of 216 trials
in total; a third of these trials (72) were switch trials (switching
from color to shape or vice versa) and the remaining two third
were repeat trials. The mean ACC and mean RT of switch costs
was measured by subtracting the mean ACC or RT on repeat trials
from the mean ACC or RT, respectively, on switch trials (cf. De
Vries and Geurts, 2012).
Theory of Mind
To test first-order and second-order ToM, the Bake Sale task
adapted from Hollebrandse et al. (2014) was used. This task
is a second-order false belief (FB) task with stories modeled
after Perner and Wimmer’s (1985) “ice cream truck story” in
which the beliefs of various characters were manipulated. Per
story, participants heard a verbal description of the events in the
story, accompanied by four pictures that were presented one by
one. During the presentation of the story, they received three
questions to probe their understanding of the events in the story,
as well as a question about the FB of another person (first-order
FB question) and a question about the FB of another person about
a second person (second-order FB question). The task consisted
of eight stories in total, each of which contained a first-order
FB question and a second-order FB question. The measures of
ToM1 and ToM2 were calculated using the ACC on the eight
first-order FB questions and the ACC on the eight second-order
FB questions, respectively.
Data Analysis
The data of the language comprehension task were analyzed
using generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs), using a logit
link to accommodate the repeatedly measured (32 trials) binary
outcome variable Accuracy (0 for incorrect, 1 for correct) (Jaeger,
2008; Heck et al., 2012). Compound symmetry was used as the
covariance matrix type. We set out with a full factorial model with
Congruency (Congruent vs. Incongruent) as within group factor
and Group (TD vs. ASD) as between group factor. Age was mean-
centered and additionally included in the model. Interactions that
did not have an effect on Accuracy (p > 0.05) were removed
from the model one by one, starting with the interaction with the
largest p-value, after which we refitted the model. This resulted
in model 1, which shows the extent to which Accuracy was
predicted by Congruency, Group, and Age, as well as the relevant
(p < 0.05) interactions. The possible presence of effects related to
Type of conjunction (Before vs. After) and Clause order (Main-
subordinate vs. Subordinate-main) were subsequently checked,
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post hoc, in model 1. For purposes of interpretation, we illustrate
significant effects using the median split method.
Next, the seven parameters derived from the N-Back task
(WM), the Flanker task (Cognitive inhibition ACC and Cognitive
inhibition RT), the cognitive flexibility task (Switch costs ACC
and Switch costs RT) and the FB task (ToM1 and ToM2) were
mean-centered and, one by one, examined as main effects and
in interaction with the significant predictors from model 1 in
seven separate analyses. The data of 3 participants (2 ASD
and 1 TD) were missing in the Cognitive inhibition ACC and
RT analyses, leaving the data of 44 participants with ASD and
41 TD participants. In each separate analysis, interactions that
had no effect on Accuracy (p > 0.05) were removed from the
model. Based on the outcomes of these analyses per predictor, we
combined the cognitive factors with (main or interaction) effects
on Accuracy (p < 0.05) and added these with the significant
predictors of model 1 in a model with multiple predictors to
evaluate their effects adjusted for one another (cf. Kuijper et al.,
2015; Overweg et al., 2018). This resulted in model 2, which
shows the relevant cognitive factors that had an effect on the
interpretation of temporal conjunctions.
Finally, the parameters from the WISC (estimated IQ on
the basis of the subtests Vocabulary and Block Design) and
PPVT (VA) were mean-centered and included in two separate
analyses in model 1. If they had an effect on Accuracy
(p < 0.05), they were added to model 2 and evaluated in
model 3. This resulted in model 3, which shows whether
these general background variables changed the effects found
in model 2. Given the significant group differences (see
Table 1) in estimated IQ and VA, this approach provides a
statistical alternative to a priori matching on estimated IQ
and VA.
RESULTS
Model 1 showed main effects of Group and Age, indicating
that the children in the TD group were more accurate in their
interpretation of temporal conjunctions than the children in
the ASD group, and that the older the child was, the better its
performance. No main effect or interactions with Congruency
were found (all p-values >0.05). A post hoc exploration of Type of
conjunction and Clause order in model 1 showed a main effect of
Type of conjunction (B =−0.943; SE = 0.14; p = 0.00), indicating
that children perform better on sentences with before than on
sentences with after. Clause order did not influence performance
(p > 0.05). Table 2 lists all remaining effects in model 1.
Figure 2 presents the mean proportions of correct responses
in the congruent and incongruent condition separately for the
ASD and TD groups.
Next, we examined one by one which cognitive factors were
associated with Accuracy. The separate analyses indicated a main
effect of WM (B = 2.355; SE = 0.747; p = 0.002) and interactions
of ToM1∗Congruency (B = 2.325; SE = 1.034; p = 0.026) and
ToM2∗Congruency (B = 1.465; SE = 0.552; p = 0.009). No effects
of Cognitive inhibition and Cognitive flexibility were found (p-
values <0.05).
Then, we combined all significant interactions and main
effects of these analyses per predictor in model 2, a model with
multiple predictors. The interaction effect of ToM1∗Congruency
was no longer significant when adjusted for the other cognitive
variables and was removed from the model. Table 2 lists all
remaining effects in model 2.
Model 2 showed a main effect of WM (p = 0.03; see Table 2),
indicating that children with lower WM are less accurate in
their interpretation of temporal conjunctions than children with
higher WM. Model 2 also showed an interaction effect of
ToM2∗Congruency (p = 0.01; see Table 2). As is shown in
Figure 3, children with lower second-order ToM understanding
are less accurate in their interpretation of temporal conjunctions
in the Incongruent condition than children with higher second-
order ToM understanding. The median split method is used to
plot Accuracy of temporal conjunction interpretation in each
condition per ToM2 group (low ToM2: ≤0.75 vs. high ToM2:
>0.75) to illustrate the direction of the interaction effect. The
figure caption of Figure 3 provides background information
about the ToM performance of each group.
The main effects of Group and Age disappeared with the
addition of ToM2 and WM in model 2 (all p-values >0.05; see
Table 2).
Finally, we checked for possible effects of the background
variables IQ and VA on Accuracy. These analyses per predictor
indicated main effects of IQ (B = 0.026; SE = 0.005; p < 0.001)
and VA (B = 0.033; SE = 0.006; p < 0.001) and an interaction
effect of VA∗Age (B = 0.001; SE = 0.00; p < 0.001). In model
3, we combined these main and interaction effects with the
effects of model 2. Model 3 showed main effects of IQ and
VA, indicating that children with a lower IQ and lower VA
show a lower Accuracy than children with a higher IQ and
higher VA, respectively. The interaction of VA∗Age remained
significant in this analysis with multiple predictors, indicating
that younger children (regardless of their VA), and older children
with low VA, were less accurate in their interpretation of temporal
conjunctions than older children with high VA, as is shown in
Figure 4. Again, the median split method is used to plot Accuracy
of temporal conjunction interpretation in each condition per
VA group to illustrate the direction of the interaction effect.
The figure caption of Figure 4 provides background information
about the VA performance of each group.
With the addition of IQ and VA, the main effect of
WM disappeared (p > 0.05). The interaction effect of
ToM2∗Congruency remained significant in model 3. Together,
the results show that second-order ToM, WM, IQ, and VA
play a role in the interpretation of temporal conjunctions.
Individual and group differences therein explain why the TD
group performs better than the ASD group and why older
children perform better than younger children.
DISCUSSION
We investigated time perception in language by examining the
interpretation of sentences containing the temporal conjunctions
before and after by native Dutch school-aged children with
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TABLE 2 | Estimated effects of variables per model on the interpretation of temporal conjunctions.
Variables Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Estimate SE p Estimate SE p Estimate SE p
Intercept 1.873 0.194 0.00∗∗ 1.605 0.192 0.00∗∗ 1.608 0.195 0.00∗∗
Group −0.549 0.191 0.01∗ −0.114 0.215 0.60 0.085 0.231 0.71
Age 0.025 0.004 0.00∗∗ 0.006 0.006 0.25 0.017 0.006 0.00∗∗
Congruency −0.292 0.188 0.12 −0.173 0.171 0.32 −0.169 0.174 0.33
ToM1 − − − 1.253 0.813 0.13 1.051 0.744 0.17
ToM2 − − − −0.334 0.401 0.41 −0.698 0.420 0.10
WM − − − 1.735 0.788 0.03∗ 1.204 0.722 0.10
ToM2*Congruency − − − 1.502 0.567 0.01∗ 1.544 0.586 0.01∗
IQ − − − − − − 0.015 0.006 0.02∗
VA − − − − − − 0.016 0.007 0.03∗
VA*Age − − − − − − 0.001 0.000 0.00∗∗
The models were built with accuracy in the language comprehension task as the dependent variable and the variables listed in the first column as independent variables.
The variable Congruency was manipulated by Type of conjunction (Before vs. After) and Clause order (Main-subordinate vs. Subordinate-main), with Before+Main-
subordinate and After+Subordinate-main resulting in Congruent items, and Before+Subordinate-main and After+Main-subordinate resulting in Incongruent items.
A post hoc exploration of Type of conjunction and Clause order in model 1 showed a main effect of Type of conjunction (B = −0.943; SE = 0.14; p = 0.00); ∗p = < 0.05;
∗∗p = < 0.01.
FIGURE 2 | Mean proportion of correct responses in the language
comprehension task per Congruency condition (Congruent vs. Incongruent)
and Group (TD vs. ASD).
and without ASD. We found, in line with our predictions,
that children with ASD were less accurate than their TD peers
at interpreting these temporal conjunctions. Contrary to our
predictions, however, children with ASD did not have particular
difficulties with temporal conjunctions in an incongruent
compared to a congruent order. Furthermore, older children
were found to perform better than younger children.
To understand the group and age effects, we examined
which cognitive factors were associated with the interpretation
of temporal conjunctions. Also, we examined whether the
general background variables IQ and Verbal Ability affected
FIGURE 3 | Mean proportion of correct responses in the language
comprehension task per Congruency condition (Congruent vs. Incongruent)
and second-order Theory of Mind (ToM2) group (low ToM2: ≤median vs. high
ToM2: >median; median = 0.75). Background information about the two
groups plotted in this figure regarding their ToM2 performance, as mean
proportions of correct responses on the second-order false belief (FB)
questions in the FB task: Low ToM2 group: 0.38; High ToM2 group: 0.94.
interpretation. We found that age, IQ and VA were the
major predictors of children’s correct interpretation of temporal
conjunctions. Furthermore, the group effect was explained
by differences in WM, second-order ToM understanding, IQ
and VA. Children with ASD as well as TD children with
lower WM made more errors when interpreting temporal
conjunctions than children with higher WM. However, the
effect of WM disappeared when taking into account children’s
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FIGURE 4 | Mean proportion of correct responses in the language
comprehension task per Age group (Young: ≤median vs. Old: >median;
median = 9;3 years) and Verbal ability (VA) group (low VA: ≤median vs. High
VA: >median; median = 108.50). Background information about the four
groups plotted in this figure regarding their VA, as mean scores in the PPVT:
Young-Low VA group: 99.86; Young-High VA group: 121.13; Old-Low VA
group: 95.96; Old-High VA group: 118.48.
IQ. This is not surprising, given the strong relation between
WM and IQ (Ackerman et al., 2005; Kidd, 2013). Also, IQ is
a more broadly defined cognitive variable than WM and, in
addition to measuring the simple short-term storage component
of WM (Colom et al., 2008), also measures other cognitive
abilities. VA appeared to underlie the age improvement in our
study. Younger children, and older children with lower VA,
made more errors when interpreting temporal conjunctions
than older children with higher VA. This suggests that
verbal skills must be sufficiently well developed for a mature
understanding of complex sentences such as those involving
temporal conjunctions. While suggested by previous studies
(McCormack and Hanley, 2011; Blything et al., 2015), we found
no effects of cognitive flexibility and cognitive inhibition (cf.
de Ruiter et al., 2018). Particularly relevant for our research
question and hypotheses was our finding that better second-
order ToM understanding was positively associated with correct
interpretation in an incongruent temporal order.
Although most children in our study showed a robust
understanding of sentences containing temporal conjunctions,
as predicted the children with ASD were less accurate than
their TD peers at interpreting these sentences. In line with our
hypotheses, this group difference between children with ASD
and TD children was explained by differences in WM, second-
order ToM understanding, IQ and VA. Because these cognitive
functions are more likely to be impaired in children with ASD
than in TD children (see Section “Introduction”), we attribute
the poorer performance of children with ASD to their impaired
cognitive functions rather than to their clinical diagnosis of
ASD per se. Thus, our results actually suggest a much broader
application than ASD, as the observed effects of cognitive factors
on the interpretation of temporal language are likely to be
relevant for typical development as well.
We did not find confirmation for our prediction that children
with ASD have particular difficulties with temporal conjunctions
in an incongruent order. Also, we did not find a main effect of
congruency. The children in our study performed equally well
on congruent as on incongruent items, in contrast to what has
been found in several earlier studies with TD children (Clark,
1971; Trosborg, 1982; McCormack and Hanley, 2011; Pyykkönen
and Järvikivi, 2012; Blything et al., 2015; de Ruiter et al., 2018).
Possibly, we did not find a main effect of congruency because
the children in our study were on average older (with a mean
age of 9) than the children in most earlier studies and can be
expected to have a more robust understanding of the meaning
of the temporal conjunctions. Only one effect of congruency
emerged from our data: children who make more errors in their
interpretation of temporal conjunctions in an incongruent order
were found to have a lower second-order ToM understanding.
Good ToM understanding may thus help children to correctly
interpret temporal conjunctions in an incongruent order, thereby
suggesting that perspective taking is needed to interpret temporal
conjunctions when the events are presented out of order.
One way to explain the role of ToM is that ToM understanding
helps children to shift their perspective to another point in
time in response to temporal language, and to understand the
relationship between these different temporal perspectives on
the same events (cf. McCormack and Hoerl, 1999; McCormack
and Hanley, 2011). This explanation is in line with the
literature on episodic memory based on the notion of mental
time travel (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007), or mental self-
projection (Kretschmer-Trendowicz et al., 2016). Mental time
travel involves a shift of the self from the immediate present
to an alternative temporal perspective, for example, a past
or future perspective (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Suddendorf
and Corballis, 2007). Several studies have suggested that
there is a relation between mental time travel abilities and
the comprehension of temporal language (Suddendorf and
Corballis, 2007; Ferretti and Cosentino, 2013). In addition, it
has been found that the neural processes involved in false-belief
inferencing and the neural processes involved in mental time
travel, in particular in taking the perspective of one’s future self
to choose between an immediate and a future reward, overlap
(O’Connell et al., 2018). In line with our results, this suggests
that the comprehension of temporal language involves ToM
understanding to enable hearers to shift from the immediate
present to another point in time and perceive the situation from
these different temporal perspectives.
An alternative possibility is that ToM understanding enables
hearers to shift from their own perspective to the perspective of
the speaker, for example, to find out why the speaker presented
the events in an incongruent order. de Ruiter et al. (2018) explain
their finding that children perform better with a congruent than
an incongruent order in terms of the semantic principle of
iconicity. They suggest that children initially assume an iconic
(i.e., congruent) mapping between the order of events in the
sentence and the order of events in the real world. Iconicity has
been argued elsewhere to result from perspective taking; more
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complex, marked, forms tend to express more complex, marked,
meanings (e.g., Horn, 1984; Levinson, 2000; Aissen, 2003). These
more complex meanings have been argued to be acquired later in
typical development than their less complex counterparts because
they require the hearer to reason about why the speaker did not
use the less complex form (e.g., De Hoop and Krämer, 2006;
Hendriks et al., 2010). Incongruent meanings are more complex
than congruent meanings. Also, sentences with after seem to
be more complex than sentence with before, considering the
post hoc effect of type of conjunction but not of clause order
in our study (see note of Table 2) and the observation that
before is acquired earlier than after (see Clark, 1971). Thus, a
sentence with after may require the hearer to reason about why
the speaker chose to use after rather than before, for example to
foreground or background particular information. As mentioned
above, our results indicate that children who make more errors in
their interpretation of temporal conjunctions in an incongruent
order have a lower second-order ToM understanding. Good
ToM understanding may thus help hearers to correctly interpret
temporal conjunctions in an incongruent order by allowing them
to take the speaker’s perspective to find out why the speaker
presented the events out of order.
In contrast to the study of de Ruiter et al. (2018), our
study suggests that children need sufficient WM capacity for the
interpretation of sentences containing temporal conjunctions.
The different findings of the role of WM capacity could be
the result of different WM measures. While we used a visuo-
spatial WM task (an N-Back task) to operationalize WM capacity,
de Ruiter and colleagues used three short-term memory tasks
that do not require manipulation of the stored information (a
word repetition task, a non-word repetition task and a sentence
imitation task). These tasks may not have captured WM to the
extent needed in complex sentence comprehension. Our findings
confirm the results of Blything and Cain (2016), who used a
verbal WM task (a digit span task) and also found a main effect
of WM capacity on the interpretation of temporal conjunctions.
Importantly, like Blything and Cain, we did not find that
congruency interacted with WM in the accuracy task. This
suggests that children’s difficulties with interpreting temporal
conjunctions in an incongruent order are not explained by
insufficient WM. Rather, children seem to need sufficient WM to
process complex sentences conjoined by a temporal conjunction
in general. These findings are corroborated by studies that have
shown that individuals need WM capacity for the comprehension
of other types of complex sentences as well, such as relative
clauses and complement clauses (Just and Carpenter, 1992; Lewis
et al., 2006; Montgomery et al., 2008; Boyle et al., 2013).
Turning to the implications of our study for ASD, previous
research on temporal language in children with ASD mostly
focused on production, showing deficits in the use of temporal
adverbials and tense marking (Roberts et al., 2004; Colle et al.,
2008). Here, we showed that verbal children with ASD also
struggle with the interpretation of temporal conjunctions, due
to weaker ToM understanding and lower WM capacity. This
finding highlights the need to further study the interpretation
of temporal expressions and temporal ordering in individuals
with ASD. Languages have various ways to mark present, past
and future and do so in almost every sentence. For example,
English has tense marking on the finite verb, temporal adverbials
such as now, yesterday, and tomorrow, and in addition to before
and after also has other temporal conjunctions such as when,
while, and then. A possibility for future research is to examine
the interpretation of these and other temporal expressions in
children with ASD. A second implication of our study for
ASD concerns the nature of the language and communication
difficulties in children with ASD. Linguistic deficits in verbal
children with ASD are mostly viewed as difficulties with
pragmatic aspects of language, which depend on its usage in
context (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). However, the
interpretation of temporal conjunctions depends on the meaning
of the conjunction and its position in the sentence independently
of their usage in context, and therefore, difficulty with their
interpretation is structural (i.e., syntactic and semantic) rather
than pragmatic in nature. In line with previous studies (Boucher,
2012; Durrleman et al., 2015), our results indicate the need to
investigate the linguistic deficits in verbal children with ASD
beyond pragmatics.
Summarizing, our study showed that children with ASD
were less accurate at interpreting sentences containing temporal
conjunctions than their TD peers, but did not have more
difficulty in an incongruent rather than a congruent order.
The different overall performance of children with ASD and
TD children was explained by differences in second-order
ToM understanding, WM, IQ, and VA, indicating that these
factors likely contribute to the mature interpretation of temporal
conjunctions. Specifically, second-order ToM understanding was
associated with the interpretation of temporal conjunctions in an
incongruent order, suggesting that perspective taking is needed to
either shift one’s own perspective as a hearer from the immediate
present to another point in time and relate these different
temporal perspectives on the same events, or to shift to the
perspective of the speaker to consider the speaker’s linguistic
choices.
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